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Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Management, 793 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2015)
Kathryn S. Ore
In Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Management, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained the correct application of the
zone of interests test and further solidified the importance of proper NEPA and
NHPA analysis in geothermal leasing. The court reaffirmed that the BLM and the
Forest Service must conduct additional cultural and environmental analysis when
granting lease extensions under the Geothermal Steam Act. Furthermore, it
rejected the BLM’s decision to grant forty-year lease continuations to unproven
geothermal leases by treating them as a unit rather than individually.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Management (“Pit River II”), the Pit
River Tribe joined with several regional environmental organizations
(collectively “Pit River”) to assert that the Bureau of Land Management’s
(“BLM”) and the United States Forest Service’s (“USFS”) continuation of
geothermal leases in the Medicine Lake Highlands violated the Geothermal
Steam Act (“GSA”), the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the
National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), and the Federal government’s
fiduciary trust responsibility to American Indian tribes.1 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California rejected Pit River’s NEPA,
NHPA, and fiduciary duty claims on the basis that the BLM lacked “discretion to
consider environmental, historical, or cultural interests before continuing the
leases.”2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded, concluding that Pit River’s claims were not limited to the GSA’s lease
continuation clause.3 Instead, Pit River’s challenge implicated both the lease
continuation provision and the lease extension provision.4 Since the lease
extension provision requires the BLM to conduct additional review under NEPA
and NHPA, the Ninth Circuit held that Pit River’s claim fell within the
provision’s “zone of interests.”5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Enacted in 1970, the GSA responded to growing national interest in the
development of geothermal resources due to public concern about energy

1
Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 793 F.3d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir. 2015)
[hereinafter Pit River II]; see Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-581, 84 Stat. 1566
(Dec. 24, 1970) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1027 (2012)).
2
Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1148-49; see 30 U.S.C. § 1005(a).
3
Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1149.
4
Id.; see 30 U.S.C. § 1005(g).
5
Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1149.
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shortages and environmental pollution.6 The GSA provides the framework for
developing and using geothermal steam on federal lands.7 Under the GSA, when
a geothermal lease produces geothermal steam or utilizes it in commercial
quantities after the initial ten-year lease term, the Secretary of the Interior
(“Secretary”) must grant a lease continuation for up to an additional forty-year
term.8 If no geothermal steam is produced or utilized, the Secretary may choose
to extend the lease for successive five-year terms under certain conditions.9
These five-year lease extensions require additional NEPA and NHPA review to
consider the potential cultural, historical, and environmental effects of the lease
extension.10 The non-discretionary ten-year lease continuations do not require
additional NEPA and NHPA review.11
Between 1982 and 1988, the BLM authorized geothermal development
in the Medicine Lake Highlands of northeastern California, and granted the
leases at issue in Pit River II.12 The BLM also entered into a “Unit Agreement,”
which provided that drilling or operating on any tract of the leased land unit
would be “accepted and deemed to be performed upon and for the benefit of each
and every tract.”13 The BLM’s decision to authorize leasing followed the
completion of a supplemental Environmental Assessment (“EA”) under NEPA.14
Geothermal development in the Medicine Lake Highlands conflicts with
a number of tribal and non-tribal interests.15 The Pit River Tribe’s ancestral
homeland includes the Medicine Lake Highlands.16 Members of the Tribe regard
the area as sacred, and continue to use it “for a variety of spiritual and traditional
cultural purposes that depend on the physical, environmental, and visual integrity
of th[ose] areas, and their quietude.”17 Non-tribal individuals and environmental
organizations also have recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and environmental
interests in the area.18
After the initial ten-year leasing period, one of the leaseholders requested
extensions for leases it owned in the Medicine Lake Highlands.19 The BLM
internally disagreed on whether to grant a forty-year lease continuation for all the
unproven leases as a unit, or to divide the unit and only grant the continuation to

6

Robert B. Keiter, The Old Faithful Protection Act: Congress, National Park
Ecosystems, and Private Property Rights 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 5, 9-10 (1993).
7
Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1149-50.
8
30 U.S.C. § 1005(a).
9
Id. § 1005(g).
10
Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 781-84 (9th Cir. 2006)
[hereinafter Pit River I].
11
Id.
12
Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1150–53.
13
Id. at 1150–51.
14
Id. at 1151.
15
Id. at 1149.
16
Id.
17
Id. (internal citations omitted).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1151.
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individual proven leases.20 Ultimately, in 1991, the BLM decided to grant a fortyyear lease continuation to the single proven lease, and five-year lease extensions
to the remaining unproven leases.21 The leaseholder responded by requesting the
BLM rescind its decision and grant a forty-year continuation under the Unit
Agreement provisions.22 The BLM declined this request.23 Five years later, the
leaseholder renewed its request and, in 1998, the BLM reversed its earlier
decision and granted a forty-year continuation for the unproven leases as a unit.24
At the time, the BLM did not explain why it changed its statutory interpretation
of the GSA.25
In 2002, several of the plaintiffs in Pit River II filed a suit (“Pit River I”)
that challenged a separate BLM decision.26 In Pit River I, the Ninth Circuit
determined the GSA’s lease extension provision was discretionary because it
provided that geothermal leases “may” be extended rather than “shall” be
extended.27 Since the Ninth Circuit determined the decision to grant lease
extensions was discretionary and the earlier considerations of the cultural and
environmental impacts were inadequate, the BLM was required to conduct
proper NEPA and NHPA review prior to extending the leases.28
While Pit River I was pending, the Pit River Tribe and Save Medicine
Lake Coalition filed two separate suits challenging the BLM’s 1998 decision to
grant the forty-year lease continuation.29 In 2012, the district court consolidated
the two separate suits into Pit River II.30 Pit River agreed to file an amended
complaint, and stipulated to limit its cause of action to the 1998 lease
extensions.31 As a result, the district court concluded that Pit River had waived all
of its GSA claims except the allegation that the BLM “unlawfully and
retroactively continued the 26 leases . . . for an additional period of 40 years in
May 1998 in absence of any commercial production.”32 Since the BLM does not
have discretion to withhold a lease continuation if the requirements of the
continuation provision are met, the district court determined that Pit River failed

20

Id.
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1151–52.
24
Id. at 1152.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 1153. The BLM’s decision in Pit River I involved two leases located in a
different unit than the leases at issue in Pit River II.
27
Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1153 (discussing Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 780).
28
Id. (discussing Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 788).
29
Id.; see Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 04-0956 (E.D. Cal. filed
May 17, 2004); Save Medicine Lake Coal. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. No. 04-0969 (E.D. Cal.
filed May 18, 2004).
30
Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1154.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1157 (internal citations omitted).
21

4

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

to state a claim.33 The district court entered judgment for the BLM, and dismissed
Pit River’s NEPA, NHPA, and fiduciary duty claims.34
III. ANALYSIS
Since the GSA does not provide for a private right of action, Pit River
relied on the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to challenge the BLM’s
decision to continue the unproven leases as a unit.35 To bring a cause of action
under the APA, a plaintiff’s interests “must be arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute” at issue.36 Often
characterized as a jurisdictional “prudential standing” requirement, the zone of
interests test helps determine if “‘particular plaintiff[s] should be heard to
complain of a particular agency decision.’”37 In applying the test, a court will
specifically focus on “Congress’s intent ‘to make agency action presumptively
reviewable.’”38
Last year, the Supreme Court of the United States “rejected the
‘prudential standing’ label” and emphasized that the zone of interests test is not a
jurisdictional analysis.39 The zone of interests test instead requires the court to
use “‘traditional tools of statutory interpretation’” to establish whether a
plaintiff’s claim falls within a “‘legislatively conferred cause of action.’”40 It only
forecloses a suit “‘when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be
assumed that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.’”41
In order to determine the “pivotal question” of whether Pit River’s
claims fell within the GSA’s zone of interests, the Ninth Circuit addressed
Congress’s purpose for enacting the GSA.42 Instead of looking at the GSA’s
overall statutory scheme to decide if Congress “intended to create a cause of
action encompassing Pit River’s claims,” the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis
on the particular statutory provision.43 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit held that Pit
River’s ability to challenge the leases did not arise out of the GSA’s broad
objectives, but rather from the GSA’s discretionary lease extension provision.44
33

Id.
Id.
35
Id. at 1150.
36
Id. (internal citations omitted).
37
Id. at 1156 (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)).
38
Id. (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012)) (internal citation omitted).
39
Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1377, 1387-88 (2014)).
40
Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1387).
41
Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1389) (internal citations omitted).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1156-57; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (“[T]he zone of interests
test is to be determined not be reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question . . . but
by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.” Id. at 175-76).
44
Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1157.
34
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Focusing on the district court’s conclusion that Pit River had abandoned
its challenge of the BLM’s interpretation of the GSA’s lease extension provision,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that Pit River clearly never limited its claims
to only the lease continuation provision.45 The district court’s decision had relied
heavily on its determination that Pit River’s claim was entirely based on the
GSA’s lease continuation provision.46 Since GSA’s lease continuation provision
was mandatory, it did not permit or require “consideration of environmental
concerns or competing land uses.”47 As a result, the district court reasoned that
Pit River’s suit was not within the zone of interests because the BLM lacked
discretion to consider environmental, cultural, or historic factors in determining
whether to grant lease continuations.48
In reversing this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that Pit River had
not abandoned its claim under the GSA lease extension provision and, therefore,
the zone of interests test did not foreclose Pit River’s suit.49 This decision
reinvigorated Pit River’s NEPA, NHPA, and fiduciary duty claims.50 The Ninth
Circuit stated that if Pit River were to prevail on remand and the leases were
determined eligible for only five-year lease extensions, the BLM would be
“required to comply with NEPA and NHPA.”51 Compliance would involve
additional consultation with the affected tribes, individuals, and environmental
organizations.52
IV. CONCLUSION
Pit River II demonstrates the proper application of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent reinterpretation of the zone of interests test. Additionally, Pit
River II reaffirms the Ninth Circuit’s earlier holding in Pit River I by confirming
the requirement for additional NEPA and NHPA compliance under the GSA’s
lease extension provision. As a result, geothermal leases previously granted
without sufficient NEPA and NHPA analysis cannot be extended without
additional consideration of environmental, historical, and cultural interests. Pit
River II rejected the notion that geothermal lease units, comprised of individual
leases, should be grouped together when deciding whether to grant a continuation
or extension. According to the Ninth Circuit, the BLM must instead decide
whether to grant a continuation or extension on a lease-by-lease basis. This
holding ensures leaseholders cannot forego additional environmental, historical,
and cultural review by contracting to have unproven leases granted long-term
continuations just because they are located within a unit that contains a proven
geothermal lease.
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1155 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1157-58.
Id.
Id. at 1159.
Id.
Id.

